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Case Notes
Minimum Unit Pricing for Alcohol May Not be a Proportionate
Public Health Intervention
Oliver Bartlett*
Case C-3 3 3 /1 4 Scotch Whisky Association and Others v Lord Advocate and Advocate Gen-
eral for Scotland /2015] ECLI:EU:C:2o15 :845
1. Background to the Case
Setting a minimum unit price for the sale of alcoholic
beverages has been on the agenda of the Scottish gov-
ernment for many years. As far back as 1999 the then
newly formed Scottish Government decided to re-
view data on the use of alcohol' that revealed trends
in Scottish alcohol consumption such as the fact that
in the two decades following 1994 alcohol sales went
from being split equally between the on-trade and
off trade to the off trade comprising around 70 per
cent of sales. 2 Further studies reveal that the afford-
ability of alcohol throughout the whole United King-
dom increased steadily between 1987 and 2007, with
duty increases frequently short of inflation, and with
supermarkets continuing to use alcohol as a loss-
leader.3 The result has been an increase in the afford-
ability of wines and beers by 129% and 153% respec-
tively.4
Another study focussing on alcohol related admis-
sions to a hospital in Edinburgh found that 'this pa-
tient population purchases alcohol units on average
Lecturer in Law, University of Liverpool School of Law and
Social Justice.
1 Peter Rice, Why do health professions want Minimum Unit Price
in Scotland' (Scotland the Brave! Alcohol Policy in Scotland, 51
September 2014, Brussels), available on the Internet at <http://
www.epha.org/[MG/pdf/mup-event-summary.pdf> (last accessed
on 16 February 2016), at p. 2.
2 ibid, at p. 2.
3 Petra Meier, 'Polarized drinking patterns and alcohol deregula-
tion' 27 (5) Nordic Studies on Alcohol and Drugs (2010), pp. 383
et seqq., at p. 395.
4 ibid, at p. 396.
5 Heather Black et al, "The price of a drink: levels of consumption
an price paidper unit of alcohol by Edinburgh's ill drinkers with a
comparison to wider
alcohol sales in Scotland" 106 Addiction (2010), pp. 729 et
seqq., at p. 733.
at £0.29 less per unit than that paid on average by
the general Scottish population,5 and that 'of these
patients, those who pay the lowest prices per unit
tend to consume the greatest number of units'.6 A Sh-
effield University Study that is consistently referred
to by the Scottish Government furthermore found
that setting a minimum unit price for alcohol of £0.50
may lead to a 5.7% reduction in population alcohol
consumption,7 mostly attributable to reductions in
'the consumption of heavier drinkers'.8 An evidence
base comprised of empirical findings such as these
has been the driving force behind efforts to reduce
the harm caused in Scotland by the consumption of
alcoholic beverages that are low in price but high in
alcoholic strength (LPHS alcohol), which are
favoured by the heaviest and most hazardous
drinkers.
The Scottish Parliament rejected minimum pric-
ing in 2010,9 however after the UK general election
returned a majority Scottish National Party govern-
ment in Scotland, plans for minimum unit pricing
were reintroduced into the Scottish Parliament, 10 and
6
7
ibid, at p. 734.
Petra Meier et al, Model-based appraisal of alcohol minimum
pricing and off-licenced trade discount bans in Scotland using the
Sheffield alcohol policy model
(v2): - second update based on newly available data (University
of Sheffield, 2012)
available on the internet at
<http://www.shef.ac.uk/polopoly-fs/1.156503!/file/scotlandjan
.pdf> at p. 5.
8 ibid.
9 BBC News, 'MSPs pass Alcohol Bill without minimum drink
pricing' (BBC News, 10 November 2010) available on the internet
at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/uk-scotland-1 1719594>
(last accessed 16 February 2016)
10 BBC News, 'Scottish government reintroduces alcohol pricing
bill' (BBC News, 1 November 2011) available on the internet at
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics
-15525950> (last accessed 16 February 2016)
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were successfully voted through on 24 May 2012 in
the form of the Alcohol (Minimum Pricing)(Scot-
land) Act 2012 (the Act).
Section 1(2) of the Act amends schedule 3 of the
Licensing (Scotland) Act 2005 to ensure that in all li-
censed premises, 'alcohol must not be sold on the
premises at a price below its minimum price'. The
Act stipulates that the formula to be used in calculat-
ing the minimum unit price is the minimum price
per unit given in pounds, multiplied by the strength
of the alcohol given in ABV percentage, multiplied
by the volume of alcohol given in litres, multiplied
by 1oo - or MUP x S xV x loo. Section 2 of the Draft
Alcohol (Minimum Price per Unit)(Scotland) Order
has provisionally set the minimum price per unit as
0.5o. By way of example, under the Act a bottle of
wine of 12% ABV would be 0.50 x 0.12 x 0.75 x 100
= E4-50.
When the Act was introduced, it attracted substan-
tial criticism from industry operators and several
Member States, 1 as well as the European Commis-
sion, who issued a Detailed Opinion which argued
that the Scottish measure unlawfully restricted trade
within the internal market. 1 2 Opposition culminated
in a consortium of alcohol producers, led by the
Scotch Whisky Association, petitioning for judicial
review of the Act. The grounds of petition relating to
EU law were incompatibility with Article 34 TFEU,
inability for justification under Article 36 TFEU, and
incompatibility with the common organisation of the
11 For further detail on the objections raised, see: Oliver Bartlett,
'Distilling prospects: reflections of the proportionality of mini-
mum unit pricing under EU law' 1 European Journal of Risk
Regulation [2014], pp. 7 3 etseqq.
12 Commission Communication SG (2012) D/52513.
13 The Scotch Whisky Association & Ors [2013] CSOH 70, para 81.
14 See: Aidan Robertson, 'Minimum unit pricing for alcohol in the
Court of Justice' 4 European Journal of Risk Regulation [2014],
pp. 459 et seqq.
15 Opinion of Advocate General Bot, delivered on 3 September
2015, in Case C-333/14 The Scotch Whisky Association and
Others [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:527.
16 Case C-333/14 The Scotch Whisky Association and Others [2015]
ECLI:EU:C:201 5:845, para 28
17 Case C-8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville [1974]
ECLI:EU:C:1974:82
18 note 16, at paras 31-32
19 Case C-456/1 0 ANETT [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:241.
20 note 13, at para 33
21 Case C-21 70/04 Rosengren and Others v Riksdklagaren [2007]
ECLI:EU:C:2007:313
22 note 16, at para 35
market in wine. This challenge was initially dis-
missed by Lord Doherty in the Outer House of the
Court of Session, where his Lordship held that there
was 'objective justification for the conclusion that the
alternative measures would be likely to be less effec-
tive in achieving the legitimate aims which the min-
imum pricing measures pursue'.1 3 Upon appeal to
the Inner House a preliminary reference was made
to the Court of Justice of the European Union (the
Court), comprised of six questions on the application
of EU law. 1 4 The next section of this piece analyses
the Court's response.
11. Judgement of the Court
Following an Advocate General's Opinion that was
generally cautious on the legality of minimum unit
pricing for alcohol (MUP)," the Court delivered its
judgement on 23 December 2015. It can be sum-
marised as a disappointment for public health advo-
cates but not necessarily the end of MUP in Europe.
The Court noted that the answer to all questions
posed, including the single question on the common
organisation of the market in wine, 'specifically con-
cerns the analysis of the proportionality of [the] leg-
islation',1 6 and thus an analysis of proportionality
constituted the bulk of the judgement.
The Court began by applying the classic case law
on Articles 34 (prohibition of quantitate restrictions
on imports) and 36 TFEU (circumstances in which
derogation from Article 34 is justified). Since MUP
erases competitive advantages arising from lower
production costs it hinders trade within the mean-
ing of Dassonville1 7 and is therefore caught by Arti-
cle 3418 In line with case law including ANNETT,"
MUP may be justified under Article 36 on grounds
of protection of health and life of humans, but only
if appropriate and necessary for achieving the objec-
tive pursued.2 0 Finally, in line with case law includ-
ing Rosengren,2 1 Member States can decide the de-
gree of public health protection they wish to pursue,
including whether to implement measures such as
MUP, as long as they remain within the limits of the
Treaties. 2 2
The Court then turned its attention to the propor
tionality of MUP. The Court first noted that 'it is ap-
parent from the Explanatory Notes that accompanied
the draft of the 2012 Act ... and from a recent study
entitled "Business and Regulatory Impact Assess-
EJRR 1|2016
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ment", that that legislation pursues a twofold objec-
tive',23 namely of reducing harmful and hazardous
consumption specifically and population consump-
tion generally - a twofold objective that the Lord Ad-
vocate confirmed in the hearing. 2 4 The framing of
the Act's objectives was crucial. The Scottish Govern-
ment allowed the Court to misinterpret the targeting
of the Act and assume that reducing consumption
specifically and generally were equal objectives,
when in reality MUP targets hazardous and harmful
drinkers while incidentally reducing population con-
sumption.
On the question of appropriateness, the Court held
that it was not unreasonable to consider that MUP,
'the very specific aim of which is to increase the price
of cheap alcoholic drinks, is capable of reducing the
consumption of alcohol, in general and the haz-
ardous or harmful consumption of alcohol, in par
ticular'.25 Thus, the appropriateness of MUP in
achieving both general and specific objectives of pub-
lic health protection was not in doubt for the Court.
On the question of necessity, the Court started by
pointing out that tax, a measure that is less trade re-
strictive than MUP, is an important tool for discour
aging alcohol consumption, and that raising the price
of alcoholic beverages to a high level 'can adequate-
ly be pursued by their increased taxation, since in-
creases in excise duties must sooner or later be re-
flected in increased retail selling prices, without im-
pinging on the free formation of prices'.26 This is
questionable reasoning. The Court cannot know with
certainty that industries will pass on tax rises in full
to the consumer,2 7 and therefore that taxation will
be effective as intended.
The Court continued to factor misunderstandings
of public health practice into its proportionality
analysis. The Court supported its reasoning on the
general effectiveness of taxation with case law on to-
bacco taxation, but then held that:
'the fact that the case law cited in the preceding
paragraph concerns tobacco products does not
mean that it is inapplicable to the main proceed-
ings, which concern the trade in alcoholic drinks.
In the context of national measures which have as
their objective the protection of human life and
health, and irrespective of the particular charac-
teristics of each product, an increase in the prices
of alcoholic drinks can be achieved, as was the case
with respect to tobacco products by increased tax-
ation'.28
This reasoning is unsatisfactory from a public health
viewpoint - the particular characteristics of products
are crucial when determining the desirability of pub-
lic health measures, including taxation. Tobacco-con-
tainingproducts always cause harmwhenconsumed,
and are relatively homogenous in terms of the pur
pose they fulfill for the consumer. Alcoholic bever
ages do not always cause harm, are an extremely het-
erogeneous product, and serve a variety of consump-
tion desires. Raising the price of tobacco in order to
discourage consumption is desirable in every circum-
stance. However this is not the case for alcohol, since
even tax increases within certain categories of bev-
erage cannot effectively discriminate between the va-
riety of products and the ways in which they are con-
sumed - some of which do not need to be discour
aged. A large increase in tax of the kind envisaged
by the Court would be liable to raise the price of bev-
erages for which discouragement of consumption is
not necessary, warranted or likely to occur, such as
with respect to more expensive, non-mass market
and bespoke products.
It is submitted that the Court was misguided in
applying the case law on the public health effects of
tobacco taxation to alcohol taxation without ques-
tion. The Court's subsequent implication that MUP
is unnecessary for securing general and specific price
rises on alcoholic beverages due to the availability of
a less trade restrictive measure such as taxation was
therefore a disappointing one, in view of the ques-
tionable effectiveness of a blunt measure such as tax-
ation in securing specific objectives of reducing
LPHS alcohol consumption.FUENOTE 3oo NICHT
GEFUNDEN This is especially so in view of the
Court's later statement that governments are not un-
der an obligation to 'prove, positively, that no other
conceivable measure could enable the legitimate ob-
jective pursued to be attained under the same condi-
tions'.30
23 note 16, at para 34
24 note 16, at para 34
25 note 16, at para 36.
26 note 16, at para 44
27 Jenny Chalmers et al, 'Real or perceived impediments to mini-
mum pricing of alcohol in Australia: public opinion, the industry
and the law' 24(6) International Journal of Drug Policy (2013),
pp. 517 et seqq.
28 note 16, at para 45
30 note 16, at para 55
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Mistaken or not in its conclusion that taxation is
an equally effective public health tool whatever the
product, the Court then proceeded to state that the
fact that increased taxation affects harmful and mod-
erate drinkers alike 'does not appear, in the light of
the twofold objective pursued by the national legis-
lation at issue in the main proceedings ... to lead to
the conclusion that such increased taxation is less ef
fective than the measure chosen'." The additional
benefits offered by taxation of contributing to gen-
eral objectives 'not only cannot constitute a reason
to reject such a measure, but is in fact a factor to sup-
port that measure being preferred'.3 2 This led the
Court to the inexorable conclusion that 'Articles 34
TFEU and 36 TFEU must be interpreted as preclud-
ing ... the option of legislation ... which imposes an
MPU ... and rejecting a measure ... that may be less
restrictive of trade and competition'." This conclu-
sion feels distinctly unsatisfactory from a public
health perspective.
However from a legal perspective this decision was
somewhat inevitable. By telling the Court that there
is a general, albeit secondary, objective pursued by
the Act, the Scottish government led the Court to
frame its analysis in terms of a twofold objective. The
Court's analyses in alcohol control cases have tend-
ed to be economically oriented,3 4 and this case is no
exception. If price rises constitute an effective pub-
lic health tool in general, and taxation raises the price
of drinks consumed by the specific and general tar
get populations without being as restrictive of trade
as MUP, and the stated objective of intervention is
both specific and general, it was not surprising that
the application of an economically oriented internal
market analysis led to the conclusion that MUP is a
potentially disproportionate restriction on trade
when taxation is also available.
Despite this, there may yet be hope for the Scot-
tish government. At the brink of an outright declara-
tion that MUP is disproportionate, the Court stayed
31 note 16, at para 47
32 note 16, at para 47
33 note 16, at para 50
34 Ben Baumberg and Peter Anderson, 'Health, alcohol and EU law:
understanding the impact of European single market law on
alcohol policies' 19(4) European Journal of Public Health (2008),
pp. 392 et seqq.
35 Case C-405/98 Konsumentombudsmannen v Gourmet Interna-
tional Products [2001] ECLI:EU:C:2001:135.
36 note 16, at para 49
true to its Gourmet 5 judgement and declared that 'it
is however for the referring court, which alone has
available to it all the matters of fact and law pertain-
ing to the circumstances of the main proceedings, to
determine whether ... [taxation] is capable of protect-
ing human life and health as effectively [as MUP] ...
while being less restrictive of trade'.3 6 The Court con-
firms that it is, in the end, the national court who
must decide whether the summary of the law given
by the Court is actually applicable to the Scottish cir
cumstances specifically. This may throw a lifeline to
the Scottish Government, who now have a second
chance to present all of the evidence on MUP with
maximum clarity, and to emphasise the targeting of
the 2012 Act to the Court of Session - provided the
Court of Session can be persuaded, of course.
III. Implications for Alcohol Control
Policy
The judgement of the Court in Scotch Whisky is good
and bad news for public health advocates. The bad
news is that the judgment clearly demonstrates the
CJEU's lack of understanding of the comparative ef
fectiveness of public health interventions, and its
conviction that taxation should be preferred if price
measures are desirable for public health protection.
There was an air of ambivalence towards MUP in the
Court's analysis, the Court being clear that internal
market principles would be breached if MUP is adopt-
ed in the face of equally effective and less trade-re-
strictive measures. The Court also demonstrated a
willingness to prioritise the protection of economic
freedoms over protection of public health in this case.
There is nothing to suggest that the Court would
change this economic approach when confronted
with other ambitious public health strategies. From
this judgement we can gather that either the Court
is happy to pay little attention to the public health
imperatives that interact with internal market imper
atives in national decisions to adopt laws that might
restrict trade - or that national governments are still
not particularly competent at leveraging public
health imperatives to argue for the proportionality
of their laws.
Disheartening though the Court's decision in
Scotch Whisky may be at first, public health advo-
cates might still take solace from the judgement. It
is possible to compare this case to the infamous To-
EJRR 1|2016
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bacco Advertising 1" judgement, with respect to the
mechanical reasoning employed. The Court essen-
tially held in Scotch Whisky that if a twofold objec-
tive is pursued, MUP is a disproportionate response.
The implication beneath the surface of the judge-
ment is relatively clear - pursuit of a targeted objec-
tive only may result in MUP being proportionate. In
similar fashion to Tobacco Advertising i, the Court
did not particularly dispute the public health creden-
tials of MUP, merely how it was mapped onto the
stated objectives. Thus, it might be tentatively con-
cluded that if another, more closely targeted MUP
measure were to be brought before the Court, the
conclusion on its proportionality may be more favor
able. This possibility is encouraging for other govern-
ments that are considering implementing a mini-
mum unit price for alcohol - if they were to rigorous-
ly ensure that the targeting of their measure is clear
ly and specifically concerned with harmful and haz-
ardous drinkers only, the Scotch Whisky judgement
might actually build bridges for those governments,
rather than burn them.
37 Case C-376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council [2000]
ECLI:EU:C:2000:544
EJRR 112016
